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Dan Awrey* Principles, Prescriptions, and Polemics:
Regulating Conflicts of Interest in the
Canadian Investment Fund Industry
Conflicts of interest permeate the Canadian investment fund industry. In response,
securities regulators have promulgated National Instrument 81-107 Independent
Review Committee for Investment Funds. In the view of securities regulators, NI
81-107 reflects a "principles-based" approach toward the regulation of conflicts
of interest. This Article articulates a theoretical conception of principles-based
securities regulation, one which transcends the formalism of the traditional "rules"
versus "principles" debate to reveal a new regulatory paradigm. Thereafter, the
author explores whether and to what extent NI 81-107 truly reflects this principles-
based paradigm, manifesting the potential to tap into its inherent wisdom while
at the same time minimizing its potential drawbacks. Having reaped the fruits
of this exploration, the author concludes with a series of normative proposals
respecting how securities regulators should approach both the regulation of
conflicts of interest under NI 81-107 and, more broadly, the institutional design
and implementation of future principles-based regulatory mechanisms.
Les conflits d'int~r~t sont omniprusents dans I'industrie canadienne des fonds de
placement. Pour les pallier, les instances r~glementaires en matiere de valeurs
mobilires ont adoptJ la Norme canadienne 81-107 Examen ind6pendant des
fonds d'investissement. De I'avis des instances reglementaires en mati~re de
valeurs mobilires, la NC 81-107 reflete une approche fondse sur les principes de
la reglementation des conflits d'inter~t. L'auteurpr6sente une conception th6orique
,des r~glements sur les valeurs mobilieres fondus sur les principes, conception
qui transcende le formalisme du debat traditionnel qui oppose r~glements et
principes pour faire ressortir un nouveau paradigme en mati~re de r6glementation.
L'auteur tente ensuite de d~terminer si la NC 81-107 est I'expression veritable du
paradigme fond6 sur les principes et, dans I'affirmative, dans quelle mesure offre-
t-elle la possibilit6 de puiser dans la sagesse inh~rente de ce paradigme tout
en minimisant ses 6ventuels aspects negatifs? En conclusion, I'auteur formule
des propositions normatives sur la fagon dont les instances r~glementaires en
matiure de valeurs mobilieres devraient aborder tant la reglementation des conflits
d.'int6r6t sous le r6gime de la NC 81-107 et, de mani~re plus vaste, la conception
et la mise en oeuvre institutionnelles des futurs mecanismes de r~glementation
fondus sur les principes.
* B.A. (Hons.), LL.B., LL.M., D.Phil. Candidate (Oxford University). The author would like to
thank Prof. Anita Anand of the University of Toronto, Faculty of Law for her guidance and support,
Prof. Cristie Ford of the University of British Columbia, Faculty of Law for her comments, and the
Social Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada for its financial support in connection
with the research which ultimately resulted in the preparation of this article.
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The past twenty-five years have been a time of metamorphosis in the
Canadian investment fund industry. Cutbacks to the Canada Pension Plan
and Old Age Security, the shift from defined benefit to defined contribution
pension plans and the demographic realities of an aging yet longer-lived
population have meant that, more than at any previous moment in history,
Canadians find themselves responsible for the investment decisions which
determine their financial security.1 As Canadians have assumed increasing
control over these decisions, the primary vehicles through which they have
invested their savings have been investment funds such as retail mutual
funds, hedge funds, structured products and similar pooled investment
vehicles. As of June 2009, members of the Investment Funds Institute of
Canada (IFIC) held approximately $547.1 billion dollars in mutual fund
assets under management-up from a mere $3.6 billion in 1980.2
As evidenced by this dramatic growth, Canadians have increasingly
placed their trust in the regulated actors-investment fund managers,
portfolio managers, investment dealers and advisors-who manufacture,
I. For a more detailed description of the policy developments and demographic trends underlying
the growth of the Canadian investment fund industry, see Glorianne Stromberg, Regulatory Strategies
for the Mid-90 s: Recommendations for Regulating Investment Funds in Canada (Toronto: Ontario
Securities Commission, 1995) [Stromberg Report]. Though now somewhat dated, many of the trends
identified in the Stromberg Report have, if anything, accelerated in the 14 years since its publication.
2. IFIC, Industry Statistics (June 2009), online: <www.ific.ca>. This figure does not include other
species of investment funds (retail hedge funds, retail structured products or high net worth pooled
funds for instance), the aggregate data for which is not readily obtainable.
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manage and distribute investment funds. Inevitably, however, the manner
in which investment funds are manufactured, managed and sold spawn
potential conflicts of interest between these regulated actors and the
investors they serve. The effective regulation of these conflicts of interest
has been acknowledged by Canadian securities regulators as vital to
the objectives of investor protection, fostering fair and efficient capital
markets and the promotion of confidence in capital markets.3 In pursuit
of these objectives, provincial securities regulators, under the auspices
of the Canadian Securities Administrators (CSA), have in recent years
proposed and promulgated a series of regulatory mechanisms, culminating
on 1 November 2006 with the adoption of National Instrument 81-107
Independent Review Committee for Investment Funds.4
IThe CSA has stated that NI 81-107 reflects a "principles-based"
approach toward regulating conflicts of interest in the Canadian investment
fund industry.' The emergence and rise to prominence of principles-based
securities regulation has been dramatic, with both the U.K. Financial
Services Authority (FSA) and the Australian Securities and Investment
Commission (ASIC) adopting comprehensive principles-based regimes
within the past several years. In Canada, the British Columbia Securities
Commission (BCSC) oversaw a fundamental overhaul of its Securities Act
and related regulations in 2004 which, while ultimately not proclaimed
into force, would have also marked a pronounced shift toward more
principles-based regulation. 6 Calls for more principles-based regulation
have even figured prominently in recent proposals for reform in the U.S.7
Principles-based regulation has also been highly influential in the design
of a number of more narrowly targeted securities regulatory mechanisms,
including NI 81-107, and in the wider context of tax, accounting and
corporate governance regulation. Accordingly, while the current global
3. See Notice and Request for Comment, National Instrument 81-107, Independent Review
Committee for Investment Funds, (2005) 28:21 O.S.C.B. (Supp. 2) at 4-5 [Proposed NI 81-107].
4. (2006), 29:45 O.S.C.B. 8807 (10 November 2006) [NI 81-107]. While NI 81-107 came into
force on 1 November 2006, full compliance was not required until 1 November 2007.
5. See Canadian Securities Administrators, Concept Proposal 81-402 Striking a New Balance: A
Framework for Regulating Mutual Funds and Their Managers, (2002) 25 O.S.C.B. 1227 (1 March
2002) [Concept Proposal 81-402]; Notice and Request for Comment on Proposed National Instrument
81-107 Independent Review Committee for Mutual Funds, (2004) 27 O.S.C.B. 465 (9 January 2004)
at 480, 496, and Proposed NI 81-107, supra'note 3 at 7.
6. See Bill 38-2004, Securities Act, 5th Sess., 37th ParI., British Columbia, 2004, s. 203 [Proposed
B.C. Act]. Despite this setback, the BCSC has continued to push forward with a number of other
principles-based initiatives.
7. See, e.g. Committee on Capital Markets Regulation, Interim Report of the Committee on Capital
Markets (Washington, D.C.: Committee on Capital Markets, 2006), and New York Office of the
Mayor, Sustaining New York a and the US Global Financial Services Leadership (New York: Office of
the Mayor, 2007).
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financial crisis has led many to question the potential efficacy of principles-
based regulation, cutting through the reflexive demagoguery it is thus not
unreasonable to assert, as does Cristie Ford, that "[t]he significance and
wisdom of "principles-based" securities regulation may be among the most
pressing questions facing securities regulators internationally today."8
Through this article I hope to make three distinct yet related
contributions to the academic and public policy discourse respecting the
regulation of conflicts of interest in the investment fund industry and,
more broadly, the significance and wisdom of principles-based securities
regulation. First, I will articulate a theoretical conception of principles-
based securities regulation, one which transcends the engrained formalism
of the traditional "rules" versus "principles" debate to reveal a new,.
coherent and fundamentally different regulatory paradigm. The defining
attributes of this principles-based regulatory paradigm include an outcome-
oriented focus, a fundamental change in the philosophy of both regulators
and regulated actors toward their respective roles in achieving desired
regulatory outcomes, and a new relationship between regulators and
regulated actors, re-constituted from one of regulated (dis)trust enforced
through an adversarial process, to one premised on real trust, a more
sophisticated dialogue and shared understandings. As I will illustrate,
these attributes share a symbiotic relationship whereby the absence of
even one among them is likely to undermine the potential efficacy of any
ostensibly principles-based regulatory mechanism.
Second, I will evaluate the potential efficacy of NI 81-107 through the
lens of this emerging regulatory paradigm. More specifically, I will explore
whether and to what extent the institutional design and implementation
of NI 81-107 truly reflect a principles-based approach toward regulating
conflicts of interest, manifesting the potential to tap into the inherent wisdom
of principles-based securities regulation while at the same time minimizing
the impact of its potential drawbacks. I will argue that NI 81-107 reflects
a narrow, formalistic view of principles-based securities regulation which
lacks many of the defining attributes necessary to maximize its potential
efficacy. In this respect, the purpose of this evaluation is not simply to
examine the desirability of principles-based securities regulation from a
societal perspective-indeed, this endeavour would arguably be premature
at this early juncture. Rather, the purpose of this evaluation is to illustrate
that unlocking this inherent wisdom, and minimizing the impact of the
potential drawbacks, first requires us to formulate a theoretical conception
8. Cristie Ford, "New Governance, Compliance, and Principles-based Securities Regulation"
(2008) 45 Am. Bus. L.J. I at 1.
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of principles-based securities regulation that transcends the myopia
of the rules versus principles debate and then to rigorously apply this
conception to the institutional design and implementation of principles-
based regulatory mechanisms.
Finally, having reaped the fruits of this principles-based evaluation,
I will advance a series of normative proposals respecting how Canadian
securities regulators should approach both the regulation of conflicts
of interest under NI 81-107 and, more broadly, the institutional design
and implementation of future principles-based regulatory mechanisms.
These proposals include the clearer and more transparent articulation by
regulators of the substantive content animating principles-based regulatory
mechanisms, the explicit carving out by regulators of a good faith sphere
in which regulated actors are free to innovate, and a sustained investment
on the part of regulators, in term of both capital and philosophical buy-in,
with a view to building a more dialogic relationship with regulated actors
and other industry participants.
This article will proceed as follows. I will commence in Part I with
a brief overview of the Canadian investment fund industry with a view
to identifying and understanding the sources of the potential conflicts of
interest which NI 81-107 has been designed and implemented to address.
Against this factual backdrop, I will then describe in Part 11 the structure
and salient features of NI 81-107. In Part III of this Article I will articulate
a theoretical conception of principles-based securities regulation based on
the defining attributes identified above and discussed in greater detail below.
At the same time, I will examine the wisdom and potential drawbacks of
this emerging regulatory paradigm. In Part IV I will then examine NI 81-
107 through the lens of this regulatory paradigm with a view to evaluating
both its credentials as a principles-based regulatory mechanism and its
potential efficacy. I will conclude this article in Part V with my normative
proposals respecting how Canadian securities regulators should approach
both the regulation of conflicts of interest under NI 81-107 and, more
broadly, the institutional design and implementation of future principles-
based regulatory mechanisms.
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I. The sources of potential conflicts of interest in the Canadian
investment fund industry
As observed by Stephen Erlichman, the Canadian investment fund industry
is, "by its very nature, rife with actual and potential conflicts of interest."9
These conflicts of interest flow from a number of sources which are, in many
respects, unique to the products, structure and practices of the investment
fund industry. As described in greater detail below, these sources include:
the "false dichotomy" between an investment fund and its manager, the
multiplicity of functional relationships between an investment fund and its
manager, the manner in which managers are often compensated for their
services, the fact that managers serve multiple clients, and the structure
of the distribution channels through which investment fund securities are
sold.
The concept of an investment fund is deceptively simple. Distilled to
its essence, an investment fund is a vehicle designed to pool capital from a
number of investors into a single investment portfolio under the common
management of a professional money manager. In exchange for their
capital, investors receive securities in the investment fund which, in turn,
enters into a management agreement with the manager for its services.
Subject to applicable laws, the investment fund's constating documents
and management agreement, the investment portfolio may be comprised
of stocks, bonds and/or other securities, financial instruments or assets.
Within these constraints, the manager is vested with the discretion to, inter
alia, purchase and sell portfolio assets as it deems prudent and appropriate
in accordance with the fund's investment objectives.
An investment fund is typically brought into existence by its manager.
In Canada, the vast majority of investment fund managers are regulated
actors, registered under provincial securities legislation as, inter alia,
investment counsei/portfolio managers (or their equivalent) in the
jurisdictions in which they carry on business. The majority of investment
funds are structured either as trusts or limited partnerships (primarily
owing to the flow-through tax status of these vehicles), with the manager
generally also acting, either directly or through an affiliate, as the trustee or
general partner. Importantly, these vehicles also endow the manager with
the maximum degree of flexibility and freedom from statutory constraints
with respect to the design of the economic, portfolio management and
9. Stephen Erlichman, Making It Mutual: Aligning the Interests of Investors and Managers -
Recommendations for a Mutual Fund Governance Regime for Canada (Toronto: Ontario Securities
Commission, 2000) at 71. While Erlichman's analysis pertained to the structure of the Canadian mutual
fund industry, his observation applies with equal force to the broader investment fund industry.
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governance terms of the investment fund. These terms are typically
contained within a management agreement entered into between, on
the one hand, the manager in its capacity as trustee or general partner
of the investment fund and, on the other, the manager in its capacity as
manager.
It is at this point that one encounters the first source of potential
conflicts of interest between an investment fund and its manager. While
the terms of the management agreement (along with the fund's constating
and offering documents) are ostensibly negotiated and agreed as between
the investment fund and the manager as distinct legal entities, in reality
the manager sits on both sides of the negotiating table. Indeed, neither
the interests of the investment fund nor its eventual securityholders are
independently represented at this all-important formative stage in the life
of an investment fund. As a result of this "false dichotomy,"' 10 the manager.
thus finds itself in the dubious position of being able to dictate-to a large
extent"-the terms of the commercial bargain not only between itself and
the investment fund butalso, though the investment fund's constating and
offering documents., between the investment fund and its securityholders.
This false dichotomy thus results in a unique and stark agency problem,
one which manifests the omnipresent opportunity for, and corresponding
threat of, self-dealing on the part of the manager. 2 This false dichotomy
also sets the table for many of the other potential conflicts of interest
described in greater detail below.
The multiplicity of functional relationships between a manager and the
investment funds it manages manifest several other potential conflicts of
interest. The management agreement typically confers upon the manager
full purview over all aspects of the management and operations of the
10. Guiseppe Scaliarini, "The Fiduciary Duty of the Mutual Fund Investment Adviser and Portfolio
Manager in the United States" (1995) 10:2 J.I.B.L. 42 at 43. Indeed, this false dichotomy was
acknowledged as far back as 1969 by the Canadian Committee on Mutual Funds and Investment
Contracts, which observed: "[A]s a practical matter, and regardless of the legal form used, mutual
funds rarely, if ever, function as entities separate from their management companies." See Report of
the Canadian Committee on Mutual Funds and Investment Contracts - Provincial and Federal Study,
1969 (Ottawa: Queen's Printer, 1969) at s. 6.04 [Mutual Fund Report].
11. Managers are obviously constrained in this respect by applicable securities laws (as discussed in
greater detail below) and, arguably, the prevailing market conditions for their products.
12. A historical survey of the investment fund industry reveals that it is indeed ripe with instances in
which the latent threat of self-dealing on the part of managers has translated into allegations of real-
world misconduct; see, e.g., Re Mersch (1998), 21 O.S.C.B. 3805, Re Hirsch (1997), 20 O.S.C.B.
5708, and Re Singh (1999), 22. O.S.C.B. 462. See also the recent scandals in both Canada and the
U.S. stemming from allegations of late-trading and market timing by several managers. While all of
these matters were ultimately settled, these enforcement actions serve to underscore the omnipresent
threat of self-dealing created by the false dichotomy between a manager and the investment funds it
manages.
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investment fund. The management agreement also typically provides the
manager with the discretion to contractually delegate various management
sub-functions to third party service providers such as registrars, transfer
agents, custodians and administrators. Indeed, the manager often retains the
discretion to delegate some or all of the portfolio management functions to
third party portfolio managers. 13 In this respect, an investment fund may be
viewed as little more than a web of contractual relationships or, in the blunt
characterization of some jurists, a "mere shell.' 4 The potential delegation
of these functions creates at least two species of potential conflicts of
interest. First, to the extent that the manager or its affiliates are capable of
performing these functions, the manager possesses an economic incentive
to perform them itself (or delegate them to its affiliates), irrespective of
whether this is in fact in the best interests of the investment fund or its
securityholders.15 Second, where expenses related to the provision of such
delegated functions are borne by the investment fund (and, ultimately,
securityholders) and not payable out of the compensation of the manager,
there exists a legitimate concern that the manager is not fully incentivized
to procure the most cost-effective services. 16 A frequently cited example
of both species of potential conflict arises in the context of obtaining so-
called "best execution"' 7 of portfolio transactions.
One .relationship which managers do not generally have with the
investment funds they manage is that of securityholder. Rather, the
compensation of the manager is typically derived from a management
fee calculated on the basis of one, or a combination, of assets under
management (AUM) and/or fund performance. Where the compensation
of the manager is based, in whole or in part, on a metric (such as AUM)
which is not perfectly correlated with fund performance, this attenuated
13. In certain circumstances, investment funds may actually be required to delegate certain
management functions such as the custodianship of portfolio assets to qualified third parties; see
National Instrument 8 1-102 Mutual Funds (NI 81-102), Part 6.
14. See Tannenbaum v. Zeller, 552 F. 2d 402 at 405 (2d Cir. 1977), cited in Burks v. Lasker, 441
U.S. 471 at 480-481 (1979) and in Zell v. InterCapital Income Sec. Inc., 675 F.2d 1041 at 1046 (9 1h Cir.
1982).
15. Marc Kruithof, "Conflicts of Interest in Institutional Asset Management: Is the EU Regulatory
Approach Adequate?" in Luc Thevenoz & Rashid Bahar, eds., Conflicts of Interest: Corporate
Governance and Financial Markets (Frederick: Aspen Publishers, 2007) at 293 [Kruithof].
16. Indeed, there exists a related concern that managers are thus incentivized to allocate as many
expenses as possible to the investment funds they manage.
17. While numerous characterizations of the best execution obligation have been articulated, the
obligation is, in essence, that of an agent (such as an investment fund manager) trading securities on
behalf of a principal (such as an investment fund) to seek, on a reasonable basis, to execute the trade
(1) at the lowest available price, (2) at the lowest possible commission, and (3) in a timely fashion, (4)
all without exposing the principal to an unreasonable level of settlement risk.
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connection will represent a further source of potential conflicts of interest. 8
For example, managers compensated on the basis of AUM 19 are, from an
economic perspective, indifferent as to whether increases in AUM are
attributable to fund performance or new investment. In this respect, in the
absence of legal constraints, managers may rationally decide to allocate
scarce resources to marketing activities-which do not benefit existing
securityholders-with a view to attracting new investment, as opposed to
portfolio management activities.20 Similarly, calculating the manager's
compensation on the basis ofAUM arguably creates a potential incentive for
managers to manipulate the value of portfolio assets in order to artificially
inflate AUM. The. opportunity for manipulation will be particularly
acute with respect to illiquid or other assets (such as over-the-counter
derivatives) for which there is often no timely and/or reliable source of
market pricing data. Finally, in respect of the vast majority of investment
funds, there likely exists a critical mass in terms of AUM beyond which all
new investment is likely to translate into a drag on performance.2 Where
this critical mass is achieved, the interests of the manager compensated on
the basis ofAUM will be diametrically opposed to those of securityholders
with each additional dollar of new investment.2
Potential conflicts of interest also arise from the fact that managers
typically provide services on behalf of more than one client, including
other investment funds. Indeed, given the economies of scale associated
with investment fund management, such conflicts of interest are arguably
unavoidable.23 The resources of managers in terms of the time and effort
of their personnel are clearly finite Accordingly, "[t]he total amount
of effort the asset manager can spend is limited and might fall short of
the cumulative optimal effort applied to managing all the customers'
portfolios, so that principals in effect compete over the agent's time and
effort. 2 4 The investment opportunities available to managers are similarly
limited, requiring managers to make decisions respecting how to, inter
18. See Mutual Fund Report, supra note 10 at s. 9.05.
19. Which would include, for instance, the majority of mutual fund managers.
20. Indeed, even assuming the presence of legal constraints respecting the allocation of such
resources, this potential conflict simply re-emerges within the context of the manager's expense
allocation decisions.
21. See Joseph Chen et al., "Does Fund Size Erode Performance? The Role of Liquidity and
Organization" (2004) 94 Am. Econ. Rev. 1276; Stan Beckers & Greg Vaughan, "Small is Beautiful"
(2001) 27:4 Journal of Portfolio Management 9, and Jon Christopherson, Zhuanxin Ding & Paul
Greenwood, "The Perils of Success" (2002) 28 Journal of Portfolio Management 41.
22. This problem is particularly acute for open-ended, continuous offering funds such as mutual
funds which, absent a self-imposed cap, theoretically have no upper limit in terms of AUM.
23. Kruithof, supra note 15 at 290-91.
24. Ibid
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alia, prioritize trades, apportion "hot new issues" and allocate expenses
amongst their clients. To the extent that managers may possess incentives
to favour one client over another-whether by virtue of differing fee
structures, personal or professional affiliations or the varying abilities of
clients to effectively monitor the actions of the manager-these decisions
manifest inherent conflicts of interest.
Finally, the structure of the distribution channels through which
investment fund securities are sold represents an important source of
potential conflicts of interest. In Canada, investment funds are distributed
through investment dealers, advisors and financial planners registered
as members of the Investment Industry Regulatory Organization of
Canada and/or the Mutual Fund Dealers Association. These distributors
are intermediaries, recommending to their clients the purchase and sale
of securities, including various investment fund products. While many
managers are affiliated with one or more of these distributors, other so-
called "independent" managers possess no such affiliations. In either case,
managers understandably seek to secure "self space" for their investment
fund products with as many distributors as possible.
As observed by Glorianne Stromberg in her influential 1995 report
respecting the Canadian mutual fund industry: "virtually all aspects of
the investment fund industry are being driven today by distribution and
the competition for distribution. '25 As a result of continued growth and
industry consolidation (in particular the vertical consolidation of managers
and distributors), this competition has intensified in recent years. Given
this intense competition for shelf-space, managers find themselves under
constant pressure to provide distributors with incentives to recommend
the purchase and continued holding of their investment funds over
those of their competitors. As a result of these pressures, a myriad of
questionable incentive structures have, over time, emerged. These
incentives have included trailer fees, reciprocal commissions, marketing
incentive programs, cooperative advertising, commission rebates, bonus
commissions, cross-selling arrangements and the subsidization of capital
and other costs of distributors-all designed to incentivize distributors to
recommend their investment fund products.
26
To the extent these incentives may cause distributors to recommend
investments on a basis other than the best interests of their clients, there
clearly exists a potential conflict of interest. Furthermore, the dual business
imperatives of maintaining a critical mass in terms of AUM and securing
25. Stromberg Report, supra note I at s. 3.01.
26. For a detailed survey of these practices, see ibid. at s. 9.01.
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shelf-space exert pressure on managers to chase short-term performance
which, once again, may not be in the best interests of securityholders. These
incentives have also proven a fertile environment for the development and
proliferation of dubious sales practices on the part of distributors. One
example of such practices is "churning," the sale and subsequent repurchase
of the same securities within a client account in an effort to capture higher
commissions. While many of these questionable incentives and practices
are now either prohibited or restricted under applicable securities laws,27
others-such as trailer fees-are not. Even more importantly for the present
purposes, given the intense pressure on managers to secure both assets
and shelf-space, it is reasonable to expect that new species of incentives
and practices manifesting potential conflicts of interest will continue to
emerge.
Exacerbating the pervasiveness and deleterious impact of the
potential conflicts of interest described above is the relationship which
typically exists between managers and distributors, on the one hand, and
securityholders, on the other. The average retail investor arguably finds
themself at a distinct disadvantage vis-A-vis managers and distributors in
terms of both market and product-specific information and, more broadly,
financial acumen. What is more, even where retail investors possess
sufficient acumen, it is arguably unrealistic to expect them to actively
monitor the decisions of managers and distributors. Accordingly, as
observed by Gerard McCormack:
The beneficiary relies on the investment manager to safeguard his
economic interests. The relationship may be said to be one of power
dependency and there is clearly an informational imbalance. The trust
beneficiary is dependent on information and advice. While it may be an
exaggeration to say that the beneficiary is at the mercy of the investment
manager there is the potential for abuse of the relationship leading to the
personal enrichment of the investment manager.28
It is this relationship of trust and dependency-combined with the agency
problems and resulting conflicts of interest described above-which has
historically prompted courts to recognize the existence of a fiduciary
relationship between a manager and its clients.29 It is this same relationship
27. For a slightly more robust description of these laws, see the discussion respecting NI 81-102 and
NI 81-105 in Part 11 of this article.
28. Gerard McCormack, "Conflicts of Interest in the Investment Management Function" (1999) 20:1
The Company Lawyer 2 at 2.
29. The decision in Harvard College v. Amory, 26 Mass. 446 (1830) is frequently cited as the first in
a long line of decisions acknowledging the existence of such a fiduciary relationship.
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which has made regulatory intervention into this aspect of Canadian
capital markets such a priority and inspired the promulgation of NI 81-
107.30
II. Regulating conflicts of interest in the Canadian investment fund
industry: the structure and salient features of NI 81-1 07
As observed in the Stromberg Report: "[t]he single most difficult issue
of all of the issues that have been raised in the context of investment
funds is how to deal with situations involving conflicts of interest."
'31
The Stromberg Report spurred a series of regulatory reforms in the late
1990s which represented a valiant first attempt at addressing many of the
potential conflicts of interest described in Part I. These reforms included
the promulgation of National Instruments 81-102 Mutual Funds (NI 81-
102)32 and 81-105 Mutual Fund Sales Practices (NI 81-105).13  These
regulatory mechanisms were notable in at least two respects. First, they
extended solely to certain specified conduct and practices arising in the
context of the mutual fund, as opposed to the broader investment fund,
industry. Second, these mechanisms reflected a prescriptive, rules-based
approach toward regulating conflicts of interest.
In the view of the CSA, NI 81-107 reflects a more principles-based
approach toward regulating conflicts of interest.34 NI 81-107 imposes a
uniform standard of care on managers to act honestly and in good faith and
in the best interests of the investment fund, and to exercise the degree of
care, diligence and skill that a reasonably prudent person would exercise
in comparable circumstances. 35  With a view to enforcing this standard
30. While Christa Band has asserted that conflicts of interest in the regulatory sense cannot be
defined in terms of fiduciary duties, the CSA's statements in connection with the promulgation of NI
81-107 make it clear that-at least within the context of the regulation of conflicts of interest in the
investment fund industry-enhanced regulation flows from the fiduciary duties owed by managers;
Christa Band, "Conflicts of Interest in Financial Services and Markets. The Regulatory Aspect: Part
2" (2007) 22:2 J.I.B.L.R. 88 at 98, and Notice of National Instrument 81-107 Independent Review
Committee for Investment Funds, CSA Notice of Rule, Commentary and Related Amendments, (2006)
29:30 O.S.C.B. (Supp-l) (28 July 2006) at 3-6 [CSA Notice].
31. Stromberg Report, supra note I at 161.
32. NI 81-102 imposes restrictions on, inter alia, (1) the investment activities of mutual funds
(including concentration, control and asset type restrictions), (2) certain specified circumstances
involving conflicts of interest, (3) fundamental changes in a mutual fund, and (4) sales communications
and other representations. NI 81-102 also requires the custodianship of mutual fund portfolio assets
and imposes a number of other requirements in connection with the financial affairs of mutual funds,
the redemption of mutual fund securities and other compliance and administrative matters.
33. NI 81-105 imposes restrictions on (and in some instances prohibits) various mutual fund sales
practices including, inter alia, internal dealer incentive practices, marketing and educational practices,
reciprocal commissions, charitable donations and tied selling.
34. CSA Notice, supra note 3 at 5, 37,41.
35. N! 81-107,supra note 4 at s. 2.1.
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of care, NI 81-107 requires that every investment fund that is a reporting
issuer appoint an independent review committee (IRC) responsible for
overseeing potential conflicts of interest between the manager and the
investment fund and imposes a standard of care on IRC members which
mirrors that imposed on managers.36 The manager is then required to refer
all "conflict of interest matters" to the IRC.37
NI 81-107 defines a "conflict of interest matter" as any matter in
respect of which "a reasonable person would consider the manager or an
entity related to the manager to have an interest that may conflict with
the manager's ability to act in good faith and in the best interests of the
investment fund."3 The Commentary accompanying NI 81-107 attempts
to supplement this anemic definition by stipulating that a conflict of interest
matter is intended to capture decisions made on behalf of the investment
fund that may affect or influence the manager's ability to make decisions
in good faith and in the best interests of the investment fund including,
potentially, portfolio management processes such as the allocation of
investments among funds, and trading practices such as soft dollar
arrangements.3 9 The Commentary further provides that conflicts of interest
at the service provider level will not generally fall within the purview of NI
81-107.4" While NI 81-107 does not contemplate a materiality threshold
for potential conflict of interest matters, the Commentary states that it is
not intended to apply to "inconsequential matters."41
NI 81-107 requires that managers institute written policies and
procedures designed to govern their actions in circumstances manifesting
a potential conflict of interest matter.42 Similarly, NI 81-107 requires that
the IRC adopt a written charter setting out its mandate, responsibilities
and functions and, ideally, the policies and procedures the IRC must
follow when reviewing conflict of interest matters. 43 Where the manager
determines pursuant to its policies and procedures that there exists a
conflict of interest matter as defined by NI 81-107, it must refer the matter,
36. Ibid. at s. 3.1. Each IRC member must be "independent." Pursuant to s. 1.4(l) of NI 81-107, a
member of the IRC is independent if the member has no material relationship with the manager, the
investment fund or an entity related to the manager.
37. Ibid. at ss. 3.1, 3.9.
38. Ibid. s. 1.2(a). This section further identifies as a conflict of interest matter any matter which
falls under certain prescribed conflict of interest and self-dealing provisions under existing securities
legislation. These provisions include those relating to inter-fund trades, transactions in securities of
related issuers or of securities underwritten by related underwriters.
39. Ibid. at s. 1.2 (Commentary).
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. Ibid. at s. 2.2(l)(a).
43. Ibid. at s. 3.6.
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along with the manager's proposed course of action to address the conflict,
to the IRC for review.
44
NI 81-107 contemplates two separate standards of IRC review:
recommendation and approval. The instrument identifies three species
of conflicts requiring IRC approval: inter-fund trades, transactions in
securities of related issuers and investments in a class of securities of
an issuer underwritten by an entity related to the manager.45 In such
circumstances, an IRC must not approve an action unless it has determined,
after reasonable inquiry, that the action (1) is proposed by the manager
free from any influence by, or consideration for, an entity related to the
manager; (2) represents the business judgment of the manager uninfluenced
by considerations other than the best interests of the investment fund; (3)
is in compliance with the manager's written policies and procedures; and
(4) achieves a fair and reasonable result for the investment fund.46 All
other conflict of interest matters need only be submitted to the IRC for its
recommendation as to whether in the IRC's opinion, again after reasonable
inquiry, the proposed course of action achieves a fair and reasonable result
for the investment fund.
47
NI 81-107 incorporates a number of disclosure obligations designed to
ensure transparency and impose external discipline over both the manager
and the IRC. For example, NI 81-107 requires the IRC to prepare an
annual report to securityholders describing, inter alia, each instance in
which the manager acted in a conflict of interest matter where the IRC
did not give a positive recommendation or where the manager failed to
fulfill a condition attached to the IRC's recommendation. 48 In addition,
the IRC must notify relevant securities regulators in certain prescribed
circumstances. 49 Finally, where the manager decides to proceed with an
action in a conflict of interest matter that, in the opinion of the IRC, does
not achieve a fair and reasonable result for the investment fund, the IRC
may in its discretion require the manager to notify securityholders of its
decision."
It was the expectation of the CSA in promulgating NI 81-107 that
the instrument would serve to enhance investor protection by (1) ensuring
that the interests of investment funds (and, ultimately, securityholders)
44. Ibid. at s. 5.1.
45. Ibid. at s. 5.2(1).
46. Ibid. at s. 5.2(2).
47. Ibid. at s. 5.3(1).
48. Ibid. at s. 4.4.
49. Ibid. at s. 4.5.
50. Ibid. at s. 5.3(3).
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were at the forefront when managers were faced with conflicts of interest;
and (2) improving the decision-making processes of managers through an
upfront check on how each conflict of interest is resolved." Furthermore,
the CSA expected NI 81-107 to contribute to more efficient capital
markets by permitting managers to engage in certain types of conflict of
interest transactions without prior regulatory approval, thereby endowing
managers with greater flexibility to make timely investment decisions in
order to take advantage of perceived market opportunities that they believe
are in the best interests of the investment fund.12 The realization of these
expectations rests in large measure on the effectiveness of what the CSA
views as its principles-based approach toward the regulation of conflicts
of interest under NI 81-107.
III. Principles-based securities regulation. its defining attributes,
wisdom and potential drawbacks
The emergence of principles-based securities regulation represents one of
the most noteworthy legal developments within global capital markets in
recent years. While still in its infancy, this emerging regulatory paradigm
has already proven highly influential in connection with the design and
implementation of an impressive portfolio of regulatory mechanisms in
jurisdictions such as the U.K., Australia and Canada-including NI 81-107.
But what is principles-based securities regulation? Where do its wisdom
and potential drawbacks reside? Framing the debate surrounding these
threshold questions represents a necessary precondition to a principles-
based evaluation of NI, 81-107 and, concomitantly, the articulation of
normative proposals respecting how Canadian securities regulators should
approach both the regulation of conflicts of interest under NI 81-107 and
the institutional design and implementation of future principles-based
regulatory mechanisms.
1. Principles-based securities regulation defined
Principles-based securities regulation is frequently described as
encompassing a move away from reliance on detailed, prescriptive rules
toward more high-level principles or norms in establishing the standards
by which regulated actors are required to conduct their business activities. 3
Viewed from this perspective, the distinction between the prescriptive, rules-
51. CSA Notice, supra note 30 at 5.
52. Ibid. at 6.
53. Julia Black, Martyn Hopper & Christa Band, "Making a Success of Principles-based Regulation"
(2007) 1 Law and Financial Markets Review 191 at 191 [Black, "Making a Success"]; Financial
Services Authority, Principles-based Regulation: Focusing on Outcomes that Matter (April 2007) at
6, online: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pubs/other/principles.pdf> [FSA].
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based and principles-based approaches to securities regulation effectively
boils down to one of statutory construction and interpretation, with the
resulting normative debate revolving primarily around the relative impact
of rules versus principles within the enforcement context-in particular
with respect to the possibility of so-called "regulation by enforcement.
5 4
This perspective is, on one level, correct. A move toward more
principles-based securities regulation would necessarily entail a shift
in terms of statutory construction toward the articulation of broader
principles.55 This shift would, in turn, manifest repercussions in terms
of both statutory interpretation and enforcement. However, viewed
solely from this narrow, formalist perspective, principles-based securities
regulation forms part of-but risks ultimately being. subsumed within-the
broader theoretical debate respecting the relative merits of prescriptive
rules versus principles as regulatory mechanisms. Legal scholars have
long struggled to differentiate between rules and principles on the basis
of, inter alia, their locus on a continuum from generality to specificity,56
their temporal orientation57 and the degree of discretion which they confer
upon regulated actors.58 The resulting discourse has largely, though not
exclusively, emphasized the form of regulatory mechanisms-their statutory
construction and interpretation-over the broader philosophical approach
of regulators and regulated actors toward the promulgation, monitoring
and enforcement of, and compliance with, these mechanisms.
While this broader theoretical debate has undeniably influenced
the development of principles-based securities regulation, its defining
attributes clearly transcend this debate's engrained formalism. As
described in greater detail below, these attributes include an outcome-
oriented focus, a fundamental change in the philosophy of both regulators
and regulated actors toward their respective roles in achieving desired
54.. See e.g. James J. Park, "The Competing Paradigms of Securities Regulation" (2007) 57 Duke
L.J. 625, and Harvey L. Pitt & Karen L. Shapiro, "Securities Regulation by Enforcement: A Look
Ahead at the Next Decade" (1990) 7 Yale J. on Reg. 149.
55. Or, as Julia Black has characterized it, "formal" principles-based regulation; Julia Black, "Forms
and Paradoxes of Principles-based Regulation" (2008) 3 Capital Markets L.J. 425 at 435 [Black,
"Forms and Paradoxes"].
56. Ford, supra note 8 at 8, and Lawrence A. Cunningham, "A Prescription to Retire the Rhetoric of
"Principles-based Systems in Corporate Law, Securities Regulation and Accounting" (2007) 60 Vand.
L. Rev. 1411 at 1420.
57. Louis Kaplow, "Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis" (1992) 42 Duke L.J. 557.
58. Cunningham, supra note 56 at 1422. Observing this struggle, Cunningham has argued in favour
of retiring the rules versus principles rhetoric entirely, asserting, inter alia, that the classifications
are too crude and ambiguous to describe or guide the design of securities legislation and that most
regulatory systems cannot meaningfully be characterized as falling within one paradigm or the other;
ibid. at 1413, 1417, 1426-1433.
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regulatory outcomes and a new relationship between regulators and
regulated actors, re-constituted from one of regulated (dis)trust enforced
through an adversarial process, to one premised on real trust, a more
sophisticated dialogue and shared understandings. While some observers
have understandably viewed these attributes as each representing distinct
(albeit related) approaches to regulation,5 9 the symbiotic relationship
between these characteristics also provides ample justification - as argued
by Cristie Ford, and expanded upon below - for the view that principles-
based regulation in many respects represents a single, coherent and
fundamentally different philosophy of securities regulation.6"
The first, and perhaps most elemental, attribute of principles-based
securities regulation is its outcome-oriented focus. This focus finds
expression primarily in the form of regulatory mechanisms which are
designed with reference to-and, importantly, articulate-the regulatory
outcomes (or desired behaviours) they are designed to achieve (or
incentivize), and not simply the policies and procedures with which
regulated actors are expected to comply. As explained by the FSA's
Managing Director of Retail Markets, its principles-based approach
involves "a shift of emphasis... away from looking at the processes carried
out by firms, toward the outcomes we seek to achieve for consumers, firms
and markets.' This outcome- oriented focus is premised on the view
that regulated actors are better situated than regulators to determine-on
the basis of their specific business model and risk profile-the scope and
procedural content of the policies and procedures necessary to achieve the
desired regulatory outcomes flowing from a given principle. 62 As observed
by Cristie Ford, it flows logically from this view that "[s]ome version of
outcome oriented regulation is a necessary correlative to principles-based
regulation, in that it is a responsible way to force accountability into a
59. See e.g. Black, "Making a Success," supra note 53 at 191. While Black et. al. perceive a "radically
different" approach to regulation in some aspects of the FSA's principles-based regime (particularly
in the context of the Treat Customers Fairly (TCF) initiative), the authors are nevertheless explicit in
their view that these attributes are, ultimately, reflective of different approaches to regulation.
60. This view is reflected in Cristie Ford's article examining principles-based securities regulation
from a "new governance" perspective; see Ford, supra note 8. However, unlike Ford's article, the
intent of which is to examine principles-based securities regulation-and in particular the Proposed
B.C. Act-as a new governance regime, the focus of Part III of this article is to construct a more abstract
theoretical conception of principles-based securities regulation, examine its wisdom and potential
drawbacks and, ultimately, employ this conception to evaluate the potential efficacy of NI 81-107.
61. Dan Waters, "Implementing Principles Based Regulation" (Speech at the ABI Conference,
London, 7 December 2006), online: <http://www.fsa.gov.uk/pages/Library/Communications/
Speeches/2006/ 1207_dw.sctml>, cited in Black, "Making a Success," supra note 53 at 192.
62. Black, "Making a Success," supra note 53 at 192.
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system that leaves the articulation of the content of those principles to on-
the-ground actors."63
It is important at this juncture to distinguish between substantive
and procedural content for the purposes of principles-based securities
regulation. The substantive content of a regulatory principle is collectively
Made up of the underlying legal and/or regulatory principle which
animates it, the statutory expression (i.e. construction) of this principle,
the interpretive assumptions underpinning this statutory construction
and, importantly, the regulatory outcomes which regulators desire to
achieve through its promulgation. The procedural content of a regulatory
principle, on the other hand, consists of the specific compliance policies
and procedures designed and implemented with a view to achieving the
desired regulatory outcomes. While the provision of substantive content
is the responsibility of regulators, principles-based securities regulation is
distinctive in that it contemplates that procedural content will be provided
by regulated actors. As explored in greater detail below, the failure by
either regulators or regulated actors to fulfill their respective mandates in
this respect will serve to undermine the efficacy of any principles-based
regulatory mechanism.
The outcome-oriented focus of principles-based securities regulation
envisions a fundamental change in the philosophy of securities regulators
toward their own role in achieving desired regulatory outcomes.64 There are
several intertwined facets to this change. To the extent that the procedural
content of principles is provided by regulated actors, principles-based
securities regulation necessarily demands that regulators loosen their
grip on the reins of regulation and, in so doing, devolve responsibility
t-and leverage the accumulated expertise of-regulated actors in vital
.areas such as risk management.65 This in turn demands that a good faith
sphere be expressly carved out in which regulated actors are free to design
and implement innovative policies and procedures to achieve regulatory
outcomes without the omnipresent threat of regulatory intervention.
66
Of particular importance in carving out this sphere is a philosophy of
transparency and restraint in the deployment of enforcement resources.
67
In the absence of such a sphere, regulated actors are likely to behave as
63. Ford, supra note 8 at 60.
64. FSA, supra note 53 at 2, 6.
65. Ford, supra note 8 at 27.
66. Black, "Making a Success, supra note 53 at 200.
67. Ford, supra note 8 at 34; ibid. at 197.
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though subject to prescriptive rules,68 thereby negating many of the potential
benefits of principles-based securities regulation described below. In this
respect, principles-based securities regulation contemplates a less central
role for enforcement, or the threat thereof, as a mechanism for influencing
the behaviour of regulated actors. Finally, the outcome-oriented focus
of principles-based securities regulation demands that regulators evaluate
their own performance with reference to whether, and to what extent, they
have been successful in achieving desired regulatory outcomes ,69 and not
such potentially misleading metrics as the promulgation of regulatory
mechanisms or the number of enforcement actions commenced or
successfully prosecuted.
Principles-based securities regulation also envisions a fundamental
change in the expected role and responsibilities of regulated actors within
the regulatory process. Most importantly, principles-based regulation
requires that regulated actors actively and meaningfully engage with'
principles at the highest level with a view to designing and implementing
policies and procedures-providing procedural content-which achieve
the desired regulatory outcomes identified by regulators. This in turn
contemplates both an intensified reliance on senior management of
regulated actors in terms of their oversight and stewardship in respect of
compliance matters70 and, simultaneously, a more strategic business role
for compliance personnel.7' In a similar fashion, principles-based securities
regulation contemplates an expanded role for financial services industry
trade associations in the provision of guidance respecting regulatory
compliance matters. Principles-based securities regulation thus envisions
a substantial shift in the overall regulatory burden-especially in terms of
designing optimal compliance structures-from securities regulators to
regulated actors.72
Given this contemplated shift in the regulatory burden, it is perhaps
not surprising that principles-based securities regulation also contemplates
a fundamental re-constitution of the relationship between regulators and
regulated actors. As observed by Cristie Ford, principles-based securities
regulation "entails a regulatory structure which spans the so-called public/
68. Steven L. Schwarcz, "The 'Principles' Paradox" (2009) 10 European Bus. Org. L. Rev. 175, and
Black, "Forms and Paradoxes," supra note 55 at 449. This "chilling effect" is discussed in greater
detail in Part 111.2 below.
69. FSA, supra note 53 at 4, 14.
70. Black, "Making a Success," supra note 53 at 193.
71. Ibid. at 200.
72. Although, as described in greater detail below, any move toward more principles-based
regulation would likely involve a somewhat more permanent cost increase for regulators relative to
more prescriptive, rules-based regulation.
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private divide, pulls industry experience into regulatory decision making,
and establishes robust ongoing communication mechanisms (rather than
an information-hoarding, adversarial relationship) between industry and
regulator."73 This new relationship must necessarily be built on a foundation
of real, not regulated, trust. As explained by Mark Wagstaff:
What is implied is the primacy of real over regulated trust. This is to
counter the inadvertent embedding of suspicion in relationships between
government and business... If someone is trusted to do the right thing
because there are legal sanctions if they do not, then trust does not reside
in the person but in the rule. This is regulated trust, a construct which
does not necessarily have a view of the capabilities and drivers of the
organisation being examined, but predominantly of its capacity to comply
with rules. This narrow focus tends to produce the opposite effect of
the all-encompassing gaze which regulators are presumed to deploy, by
locating regulatory judgment in the fitness of the organisation as a rule-
obeying body, rather than what it actually delivers to its customers.
74
The anticipated product of this real trust is a more honest and sophisticated
dialogue between securities regulators and those they regulate, with the
former being more transparent about their expectations of regulated
actors and the outcomes they desire to achieve75 and the latter being more
forthcoming about the regulatory challenges they face and how these
challenges impact their business activities.76  Through this enhanced
dialogic relationship, principles-based securities regulation is intended
to promote "congruence" 77: the creation of a shared self-interest between
regulators and regulated actors with respect to the realization of desired
regulatory outcomes.
Congruence in turn demands that there exists a body of shared
understandings as between regulators and regulated actors with respect to
the meaning of the regulatory principle(s) upon which a given principles-
based regulatory mechanism is constructed. More specifically, all parties
concerned must possess shared understandings as to, inter alia, the scope
and substantive content of the relevant principles-including both the
desired regulatory outcomes and the interpretive assumptions underlying
73. Ford, supra note 8 at 28.
74. Mark Wagstaff, "Principles-based Regulation: Stability, Risk and Trust", (Paper presented to the
2nd Annual Cambridge Conference on Regulation, 12 September 2007), online: <http://www.cbr.can.
ac.uk/pdf/Wagstaff Paper.pdf' [Wagstaff].
75. FSA, supra note 53 at 8.
76. Ibid. at 17.
77. Wagstaff, supra note 74 at 18.
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these principles' statutory construction.7" In this sense, principles-based
securities regulation requires the creation of an "interpretive community"79
in which regulators and industry trade associations, in consultation
with each other and their respective constituencies, amplify principles
through the formulation and dissemination of substantive and procedural
guidance.
As described above, the defining characteristics of principles-based
securities regulation transcend the formalism of the rules versus principles
debate to reveal a new approach toward-indeed a new philosophy of-
securities regulation. Before leaving the threshold question of what
principles-based securities regulation is, however, a few caveats are in
order. First, a move toward more principles-based securities regulation
does not entail the wholesale abandonment of prescriptive rules.
Prescriptive rules are often necessary to amplify principles80 and may
represent the optimal approach to regulation where significant consensus
exists between regulators and regulated actors or where required to deter,
prosecute and punish extreme misconduct.8 ' Accordingly, prescriptive
rules can and should remain in the regulatory toolkit. Second, the preceding
description is that of an emerging regulatory paradigm. The pronounced
shift in momentum toward more principles-based securities regulation in
jurisdictions such as the U.K., Australia and Canada has arguably been
underway for less than a decade and is, at this very moment, being shaped
by the political fallout from the current global financial crisis. It is thus
likely that we will observe the continued evolution and refinement of
principles-based securities regulation as regulators and regulated actors
work together to tap into its inherent wisdom and manage its potential
drawbacks.
2. The wisdom and potential drawbacks ofprinciples-based securities
regulation
The wisdom of principles-based securities regulation-especially when
viewed vis-d-vis the more prescriptive, rules-based paradigm-resides first
and foremost in its inherent flexibility. As observed by Cristie Ford:
The advantage of regulatory principles, as opposed to detailed rules, is
not that they will remain forever vague, but rather that their content can
78. See Julia Black, "Using Rules Effectively" in Chistopher McCrudden, ed., Regulation and
Deregulation: Policy and Practice in the Utilities and Financial Services Industries (Oxford Clarendon
Press, 1999) 95.
79. Schwarcz, supra note 68 at 184.
80. FSA, supra note 53 at 9.
81. Ford, supra note 8 at 48.
90 The Dalhousie Law Journal
be filled in more dynamically and insightfully by those with the greatest
understanding of the relevant situations... The difference is that their
content is intended to remain flexible and up to date - that rather than
ossifying, the principles 'content will continue to evolve, discarding older
formulations as newer more comprehensive or effective ones emerge.
82
The flexibility of principles-based regulation, where the content of
regulation is the product of a dialogic relationship between regulator
and regulated, is thus of particular utility within the context of capital
markets and the financial services industry, where change and innovation
are perhaps the only constants. In such an environment, this flexibility
translates into greater responsiveness in addressing industry developments
and new regulatory challenges,83 especially when compared with the
bluntness of prescriptive rules. Importantly, the flexibility of principles-
based regulation also minimizes the potential opportunities for so-
called "creative compliance." As explained by Lawrence Cunningham:
"[r]ules can be blueprints for evading their underlying purposes. Bright
lines and exceptions to exceptions facilitate strategic evasion, allowing
artful dodging of a rule's spirit by literal compliance with its technical
letter."84 Through the articulation of outcome-oriented principles, and
the resulting shift in emphasis from technical to substantive compliance,
principles-based regulatory mechanisms can become, in an important way,
impervious to evasion.
The inherent flexibility of principles also enhances their durability as
a source of regulation. The promulgation of prescriptive rules represents
a crystallized, and therefore relatively static, response to the prevailing
conditions within a market, regulatory and political environment.
Thereafter incapable of reflecting changing conditions or new learning,
rules ossify quickly and, thus, require constant amendment in order to
respond to the rapid pace of change which characterizes capital markets
and the financial services industry.85 For compelling evidence of this, one
need not look any further than the chronically overcrowded policymaking
82. Ibid. at 36 [emphasis added].
83. Black, "Making a Success," supra note 53 at 193. See also David Wilson, "Momentum for
Change: Providing the Regulation Canada Needs" (keynote remarks to the Dialogue with the
OSC, Toronto, 10 November 2006), online: <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Media/Speeches/2006/sp_
20061110_dw dwo-momentum.pdf>.
84. Cunningham, supra note 56 at 1423.
85. Ford, supra note 8 at 24; Wagstaff, supra note 74 at 16.
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agenda pursued by the OSC in recent years.8 6  In sharp contrast, the
flexibility of principles enables them to evolve organically in response
to industry developments and new regulatory challenges, often without
the need for formal regulatory intervention.8" Accordingly, as observed
by Cunningham, "in rapidly-changing environments, such as securities
markets, rules can become obsolete faster than principles do."88 In this
respect, the durability of principles-based regulation enables regulators
to step off the policymaking treadmill and reallocate resources toward
building dialogic relationships with regulated actors and monitoring
and enforcing substantive compliance with principles-based regulatory
mechanisms.
As previously touched upon, through the attainment of congruence,
principles-based securities regulation also manifests the potential benefit
of better aligning the behaviour of regulated actors with desired regulatory
outcomes. Prescriptive rules are by their very nature either over-inclusive
(capturing behaviour which should be excluded) or under-inclusive.(failing
to capture behaviour which should be included).89 To the extent of this over
(under) inclusiveness, prescriptive, rules-based regulatory mechanisms
thus promote or deter the behaviour of regulated actors in ways which are
incongruent with their underlying objectives. In this way, "prescriptive
requirements emphasize the wrong things. That is, they encourage firms
to focus on detailed compliance rather than to exercise sound judgment
with a view to the best interests of their clients and the markets."9 Once
again, principles-based securities regulation minimizes this incongruence
through the articulation of outcome-oriented principles which provide
regulated actors with the flexibility-and motivation 91-to design and
implement policies and procedures which are to the fullest extent possible
aligned with the desired regulatory outcomes. Equally as important, the
86. See Ontario Securities Commission, "Statement of Priorities for Fiscal 2008-09," online: <http://
www.osc.gov.on.ca/About/WhatWeDo/wwd_2008-2009_statement-of-priorities.pdf>; and Ontario
Securities Commission, "Report on Statement of Priorities for Fiscal 2007-2008," online: <http://
www.osc.gov.on.ca/AboutiWhatWeDo/wwd_2007-2008_stateient-of-priorities-report.pdtf>.
87. Ford, supra note 8 at 45.
88. Cunningham, supra note 56 at 1423, citing Frank Partnoy, "A Revisionist View of Enron and the
Sudden Death of "May."" (2003) 48 Vill. L. Rev. 1245 at 1265.
89. Black, "Making a Success," supra note 53 at 194. See also Duncan Kennedy, "Form and
Substance in Private Law Adjudication" (1976) 89 Harv. L. Rev. 1685 at 1689.
90. Ford, supra note 8 at 19.
91. While the prospect of regulatory sanctions is no doubt the source of some of this motivation,
as Cristie Ford points out, it is also the case that firms will be motivated to implement compliance
policies and procedures in order to mitigate the risk of civil liability and/or reputational damage; ibid.
at 23.
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articulation of these outcomes provides regulated actors with real-world
yardsticks against which to assess their substantive compliance.
Finally, a move toward more principles-based securities regulation
offers potentially significant administrative benefits through the
streamlining of securities legislation.92 The voluminous and labyrinthine
structure of securities legislation in jurisdictions such as the U.S. and
Canada is perpetually at risk of devolving into an unintelligible maze of
statutes, rules, orders, policy statements and other pronouncements. In
navigating this maze, regulated actors may understandably find themselves
uncertain at times as to whether they are aware of, let alone in compliance
with, all applicable regulation. In this respect, the structure of prescriptive,
rules-based securities legislation arguably exists at cross-purposes with its
intent, making compliance both more difficult and more costly-particularly
for smaller firms which may lack the requisite in-house compliance
resources.93 By de-cluttering the prescriptive rulebook in favour of the
articulation of broader principles, principles-based securities regulation
makes regulation more transparent and accessible and, in so doing, renders
compliance by regulated actors both easier and less costly and, therefore,
more likely. While it is true that much of this 'clutter' would perhaps re-
emerge in the form of internal compliance policies and procedures and via
the proliferation of guidance from both regulators and industry,94 regulated
actors-having been actively engaged in the design and implementation
of such policies, procedures and guidance-are arguably more likely to
be able to identify the universe of applicable regulation, understand the
desired regulatory outcomes and achieve substantive compliance.
Principles-based securities regulation also manifests a number of
potentially significant drawbacks. These drawbacks flow primarily from a
perceived lack of certaintywith respect to the interpretation of principles
by regulators and, as a result, a lack of predictability with respect to their
potential application.95 Articulated somewhat differently, the inherent
flexibility of principles gives rise to the possibility that regulators and
regulated actors will arrive at divergent interpretations respecting, inter alia,
their scope and/or substantive content. The possibility of such divergence
places regulated actors in the uncomfortable position of not necessarily
knowing whether their attempts to achieve substantive compliance
92. FSA, supra note 53 at 6.
93. Ibid. at 6.
94. Thus leading, potentially, to what Julia Black has characterized as the "communicative paradox"
of principles-based regulation; Black, "Forms and Paradoxes, supra note 55 at 447, and Black,
"Making a Success," supra note 53 at 197.
95. Black, "Making a Success," supra note 53 at 196.
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with a given principle will attract regulatory scrutiny. Accordingly, as
described in greater detail below, and as will be amply illustrated in the
context of my evaluation of NI 81-107, the absence of sufficient certainty
and predictability represents a threat to the efficacy of principles-based
regulatory mechanisms.
The perceived uncertainty and unpredictability associated with
principles-based securities regulation may translate into an unintended
"chilling effect." Understandably, regulated actors generally do not want
to operate within a regulatory grey zone-especially where there exist
significant costs in connection with the risk of "getting it wrong." 96 In
such an environment, one might intuitively expect some regulated actors
to adopt more conservative interpretations of principles as a way of
mitigating this legal risk.97 By inducing regulated actors to err on the side
of caution, the absence of sufficient certainty and predictability thus runs
against the prevailing current of principles-based securities regulation-
stifling regulatory innovation rather than promoting it.98
The absence of sufficient certainty and predictability surrounding
principles-based securities regulation also raises the prospect of so-called
''regulatory creep." The concept of regulatory creep proceeds from the
premise that regulation - like matter in a gaseous state-will inevitably
expand into any empty space that it encounters. Viewed in this light, the
flexibility of principles introduces the possibility that they may be used
(or, depending on your perspective, abused) by regulators to expand
the reach of the regulatory hand into the business activities of regulated
actors in a discretionary or arbitrary fashion.99 A similar risk also arises
with respect to industry guidance, where a concern exists that industry-
developed "recommended," "good" or "best" practices will be invoked by
regulators as an "opaque proxy"'00 for prescriptive rules. While the risk
of regulatory creep is omnipresent, it is particularly acute in the context of
politically charged environments such as those which have often followed
in the wake of corporate scandals.
The possibility of divergence in the interpretation of principles exists
not only with respect to regulators vis-A-vis regulated actors, but also
within -and between regulators. There is a risk. that the philosophy and
96. Ibid. at 195.
97. Julia Black has characterized this as the "compliance paradox" of principles-based regulation;
Black, "Forms and Paradoxes," supra note 55 at 449.
98. See Carlos Conceicao & Rosalind Gray, "U.K. Principles - Problems of Uncertainty" (2007)
26:6 Int. Fin. L. Rev. 42.
99. Cunningham, supra note 56 at 1433; Wagstaff, supra note 74 at 18.
100. Wagstaff, supra note 74 at 18.
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approach of policymakers toward principles-based securities regulation
will not be shared by their colleagues responsible for on-the-ground
monitoring and enforcement. This risk has already manifested itself within
the context of the FSA's move toward more principles-based regulation
where, despite its public commitment to move away from prescription
and "tick-box" supervision, some regulated actors have reported that
FSA supervisors continue to articulate exceedingly specific expectations
in terms of compliance with regulatory principles.'' An analogous issue
arises in jurisdictions such as Canada and the European Union where, as a
result of their jurisdictionally fractured securities regulatory regimes, there
exists a very real and pressing concern that different regulators will adopt
divergent interpretations respecting the scope and/or substantive content
of principles.'
A move toward more principles-based securities regulation also
manifests significant cost implications. Louis Kaplow has asserted:
Rules typically are more costly than [principles] to create, whereas
[principles] tend to be more costly for individuals to interpret when
deciding how to act and for an adjudicator to apply to past conduct.
Second, when individuals can determine the application of rules to their
contemplated acts more cheaply, conduct is more likely to reflect the
content of previously promulgated rules than of [principles] that will be
given content only after individuals act. °3
While this statement is perhaps broadly accurate, it requires some refinement
and elaboration for use in the context of a move toward more principles-
based securities regulation. From the perspective of regulated actors, the
transition to more principles-based regulation would likely entail a short-
term increase in compliance costs stemming primarily from the (re)design
and implementation of internal policies and procedures to reflect articulated
regulatory principles. Over the longer-term, however, one might expect
that regulated actors would realize an "innovation dividend" flowing from
positive network externalities, congruence, the implementation of more
efficient compliance systems and the resulting rationalization of costs.
From the perspective of regulators, however, principles-based regulation
would likely involve a somewhat more permanent cost increase relative
to more prescriptive, rules-based regulation. While the latter approach to
101. Black, "Making a Success," supra note 53 at 198.
102. As observed by David Wilson, supra note 83 at 8: "Through consensus, the CSA might well be
able to come up with a set of common principles for each regulatory issue. But that would still mean
13 different ways of interpreting and administering them. It would be analogous to adopting a single
constitution-and leaving its interpretation to 13 separate Supreme Courts."
103. Kaplow, supra note 57 at 557.
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regulation facilitates quick processing of a large number of matters while
ensuring certainty of interpretation and predictability of application,' 04 the
former requires sustained investment in the infrastructure of principles-
based regulation, including, inter alia, the additional relationship
management personnel, on-going education programs and enhanced call
centre capabilities necessary to build dialogic relationships with regulated
actors. The FSA, for example, has earmarked up to £50 million to cover
non-recurring expenses relating to, inter alia, reorganization costs, training
and development and improved knowledge management to be incurred in
connection with its transition to a more principles-based regime. 105
The final drawback of principles-based regulation stems from its
wholesale reliance upon the establishment and maintenance of trust
between regulators and regulated actors. In the view of many observers,
the current global financial crisis has served to punctuate the limitations
of regulatory paradigms premised on trust. In the wake of the current
crisis, it is thus reasonable to question how principles-based regulation
can generate the high level of trust required in order to realize its inherent
potential. Furthermore, as Julia Black has observed, principles-based
regulation manifests a "trust paradox"10 6: while principles-based regulation
requires a high level of trust in order to be effective, it must first be
effective in order to generate this level of trust.0 7 Indeed, this drawback
may prove particularly difficult to address in. the context of regulating
conflicts of interest: where trust problems represent the motivating force
behind regulatory intervention. Nevertheless, as explored in greater detail
below, it is possible that even this formidable obstacle can be overcome.
The key, as we shall see, resides in effective institutional design and
implementation.'08
The drawbacks outlined above are, in many respects, unavoidable
by-products of any move toward more principles-based securities
regulation. 0 9 It is the inherent flexibility of principles which introduces
perceived uncertainty, the prospect of both a chilling effect and regulatory
creep and the potential for divergent interpretations. However, while
perhaps unavoidable, these drawbacks are not unmanageable. Indeed, it
is in its ability to manage (and ultimately minimize the impact of) these
drawbacks that the symbiotic relationship amongst the defining attributes
104. Black, "Making a Success," supra note 53 at 195.
105. FSA, supra note 53 at 18.
106. Black, "Forms and Paradoxes," supra note 55 at 456.
107. Ibid.
108. Ibid. at 426.
109. FSA, supra note 53 at 22. See also Black's paradoxes of principles-based regulation, ibid.
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of principles-based securities regulation is most powerful and evident.
The certainty of interpretation and predictability of application potentially
lost under principles-based securities regulation can in fact be ensured
through the clear articulation by regulators of regulatory principles and
desired regulatory outcomes, the promotion of industry guidance and,
above all, the building of dialogic relationships between regulators and
regulated actors. What is more, principles-based regulation contemplates
a good faith sphere in which regulated actors are free, indeed expected,
to design and implement innovative compliance policies and procedures.
Principles-based securities regulation thus reveals itself as much more than
a simple move away from prescriptive rules-it is, rather, a new philosophy
of securities regulation. It is this broader theoretical conception of
principles-based securities regulation which provides the grounding for
the remainder of this Article.
IV. NI 81-107: a principles-based evaluation
There exists a compelling argument in favour of principles-based regulation
as the appropriate tack to address conflicts of interest in the Canadian
investment fund industry.
As described in Part I, the mounting pressure on managers to secure
shelf-space and assets is, over time, more likely than not to result in the
emergence of new species of incentives and practices manifesting potential
conflicts of interest. As discussed in Part III, the inherent flexibility of
principles-based regulation is likely to translate into greater responsiveness-
in particular relative to more prescriptive, rules-based regulation-in
addressing the new regulatory challenges which will be posed by these
future developments. Nevertheless, it remains to be explored whether,
and to what extent, the institutional design and implementation of NI 81-
107 truly reflect a principles-based approach toward regulating conflicts
of interest, manifesting the potential to tap into the inherent wisdom of
principles-based regulation while at the same time minimizing the impact
of its potential drawbacks.
There exists a certain vantage point from which the institutional design
and implementation of NI 81-107 may appear to reflect a principles-based
regulatory paradigm. The statutory construction of NI 81-107 relies
heavily on the articulation of broad principles, particularly with respect
to such central concepts as the standard of care imposed on managers and
IRC members, the independence of IRC members and the definition of
a conflict of interest matter."' Through these broad principles and the
110. See e.g. the CSA's acknowledgement of this in the CSA Notice, supra note 30 at 37, 41.
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accompanying Commentary, NI 81-107 attempts to provide substantive
content while devolving to managers and IRCs the responsibility for
providing procedural content in terms of the policies and procedures
necessary to address conflict of interest matters. Furthermore, the process
by which NI 81-107 was conceptualized and promulgated manifested
elements of a fledgling dialogic relationship between regulators and
regulated actors. Spanning a five-year period, this process included the
publication of a background legal report," I concept proposal," 2 cost-benefit
analysis"3 and two separate proposed national instruments." 4 The views
of regulated actors were solicited throughout this process both formally,
though requests for comment, and more informally, through a series of
consultations with key industry stakeholders. It is thus possible to argue,
on a number of levels, that the institutional design and implementation of
NI 81-107 reflects a principles-based approach to regulating conflicts of
interest in the Canadian investment fund industry.
On a far more fundamental level, however, NI 81-107 reflects a
narrow, formalistic view of principles-based securities regulation which
is, ultimately, likely to undermine its potential efficacy. This regulatory
myopia is evident in terms of both the institutional design of NI 81-107
and its subsequent implementation. Perhaps most fundamentally, the CSA
has not articulated with sufficient clarity or robustness the substantive
content of NI 81-107. More specifically, the CSA has failed to provide
sufficient guidance respecting either the regulatory principle animating NI
81-107 or the desired regulatory outcomes. Beyond the CSA's high-level
statements in its draft proposals respecting enhanced investor protection
and market efficiency" 5 and the vague litmus test of ensuring "a fair and
reasonable result for the investment fund," the instrument provides scant
substantive guidance respecting the real world outcomes the CSA expects
compliance with NI 81-107 to achieve. It is unclear, for example, whether
the CSA is seeking through NI 81-107 to deter self-interested behaviour on
11l. See David P. Stevens, "Trust Law Implications of Proposed Regulatory Reform of Mutual Fund
Governance Structures" (1 March 2002), online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://www.osc.
gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part8/cp_20020301_81-402_legalreport.pdf>.
112. See Concept Proposal 81-402, supra note 5.
113. See Keith A. Martin, "Mutual Fund Governance Cost Benefit Analysis: Final Report" (July
2002), online: Ontario Securities Commission <http:www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/
Current/Other/ fg_20030714 mfg-cbarpt.pdf>', and Office of the Chief Economist, "A Cost -Benefit
Analysis on the Introduction of Independent Review Committees for Mutual Funds" (January 2004),
online: Ontario Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/current/
Part8/rule 20040109 _81-107_mutualfundanalysis.pdf>.
114. See Proposed National Instrument 81-107 Independent Review Committee for Mutual Funds,
(2004) 27:02 O.S.C.B. 526 (9 January 2004) and Proposed NI 81-107, supra note 3.
115. See discussion respecting the expectations of the CSA in promulgating NI 81-107, above at 18.
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the part of managers or, alternatively, prevent actual (or perhaps potential)
harm to investment funds and their securityholders. This is an important
distinction. If the CSA is seeking to achieve the former regulatory outcome,
how does the predominantly commercial character of the relationship
among a manager, an investment fund and its securityholders play into this
equation? If the latter, why did the CSA not attempt to incorporate into NI
81-107 conflicts of interest at the distributor level in order to better protect
investors from predatory incentive structures and sales practices? The
answers to these questions manifest potentially important ramifications in
terms of how of managers and IRCs approach conflicts of interest under
NI 81-107. In this respect, the failure of the CSA to provide outcome-
oriented substantive guidance has left managers and IRCs with a dearth
of sufficiently concrete yardsticks against which to gauge whether their
policies, procedures and proposed courses of action in respect of conflict
of interest matters are likely to achieve substantive compliance with NI
81-107.
Nowhere is the failure of the CSA to provide sufficient substantive
guidance more evident or impactful than with respect to the legal principle
animating NI 81-107. While, broadly speaking, this principle relates to
the regulation of conflicts of interest between managers, on the one hand,
and the funds they manage (and by extension their securityholders), on the
other,"6 NI 81-107 does little to put substantive meat on this skeleton.
The law has long been concerned with conflicts of interest arising in
the context of relationships which manifested asymmetries of power or
dependency." 7 It is here that one encounters an undeniable nexus between
conflicts of interest and the law of fiduciary duty. Fiduciaries owe two
distinct duties to their beneficiaries: one of care and one of loyalty."' The
duty of loyalty is itself comprised of two further duties not to (1) profit
at the expense of the beneficiary, or (2) enter into competition with the
beneficiary without their consent."19 The confluence of these duties require
that the fiduciary act at all times in the best interests of the beneficiary and
116. See Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission, "The Canadian Mutual Fund Industry: Its
Experience With and Attitudes Toward Mutual Fund Regulation" (1 March 2002), online: Ontario
Securities Commission <http://www.osc.gov.on.ca/Regulation/Rulemaking/Current/Part8/cp_
20020301_81-402 research~peport.pdf>; Concept Proposal 81-402, supra note 5 at 7; Proposed NI
81-107, supra note 3 at 4-5, and NI 81-107, supra note 4 at s. 1.2.
117. Donovan W.M. Waters, Waters 'Law of Trusts in Canada, 3d ed. (Thomson Carswell: Toronto,
2005) at 38-39 [Waters].
118. Arthur B. Laby, "Resolving Conflicts of Duty In Fiduciary Relationships" (2004) 54 Am. U. L.
Rev. 75 at 98.
119. Ibid. at 100; McCormack, supra note 28 at 5.
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avoid situations where this duty conflicts with his or her self-interest. 120
This duty has become embodied in what is known as the "sole interest"
rule.
Strictly applied, the sole interest rule stipulates that transactions
between a fiduciary and beneficiary are illegal per se. Overtime, however,
this principle has evolved from a blanket prohibition against transactions
between a fiduciary and his or her beneficiary into a patchwork of
divergent judicial approaches 2' and doctrinal,'22 categorical and statutory
exceptions.'23 This patchwork has succeeded in adding a layer of
complexity-if not outright ambiguity-to the common law treatment of
conflicts of interest in the context of fiduciary relationships.
Further compounding matters, the strict application of the sole interest
rule historically abrogated any need to articulate a precise definition of, or
theoretical approach toward, what constituted a conflict of interest. The
prevailing view within judicial circles has been that the existence of a
conflict must be determined in each case with reference to the facts and the
scope of the fiduciary duty in question.'24 Even then, the jurisprudence
demonstrates that courts-and even members of the same court-often
diverge in their opinions as to whether a given set of facts produces an
actual or potential conflict of interest. 25 This general reticence to formulate
a definition of, or theoretical approach toward, conflicts of interest extends
to lawmakers as well. As observed by Christoph Kumpan and Patrick
C. Leyens: "[c]apital market regulators, legislative institutions and legal
scholars have usually avoided an abstract and general definition of the
120. Waters, supra note 117 at 39, 877.
121. Ibid. at 905,915.
122. Longstanding doctrinal exceptions include beneficiary consent, settlor or principal authorization
and advancejudicial approval; ibid. at 1236-1240, and John H. Langbein, "Questioning the Trust Law
Duty of Loyalty: Sole Interest or Best Interest?" (2005) 114 Yale L.J. 929 at 963-964 [Langbein].
123. Indeed, many of the categorical and statutory exceptions tacitly acknowledge the questionable
utility of the sole interest rule within the context of modem commercial relationships. Perhaps most
notably, it has been acknowledged that the strict application of the sole interest rule should be relaxed
in the financial services context, where it would otherwise prohibit the provision of investment advice
and other services by financial institutions to clients who also maintain trust accounts. Such exceptions
often reflect the development of comprehensive statutory regimes governing conflicts of interest in the
areas of corporate law, financial services and trusteeship; Langbein, ibid. at 968-969.
124. See comments of the U.S. Supreme Court in S.E.C. v. Chenery (1943), 318 U.S. 80 at 85-86. See
also Waters, supra note 117 at 918.
125. Waters, supra note 117 at 918.
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term 'conflict of interest."' 126 As a result, "a theoretical foundation of what
constitutes a conflict of interest has been largely neglected."' 27
Finally, even where judges, lawmakers, legal scholars and other social
scientists have attempted to advance abstract and general definitions of
what constitutes a conflict of interest, these definitions have often differed
quite substantially. What is more, each of these definitions arguably
manifest inherent flaws - particularly in terms of their over or under-
inclusiveness - which limit their potential practical application.'28 The
differences between these definitions reflect the lack of consensus within
both academic and public policy circles respecting what constitutes a
conflict of interest. The shortcomings of these definitions, meanwhile,
illustrate the difficulties of advancing a definition which is both sufficiently
precise and congruent with the purposes for which it is to be applied.
What all this reveals is a legal principle very much in a state of
flux. There exists considerable substantive uncertainty respecting both
what constitutes a conflict of interest and how they should be treated -
especially in the context of complex modem commercial relationships.
Given this manifest uncertainty, the need for robust substantive guidance
surrounding the regulatory objectives of NI 81-107 and, in particular, the
definition a conflict of interest matter, seems readily apparent. Despite
this apparent need, however, the definition of a conflict of interest matter
articulated in NI 81-107 is decidedly unhelpful, relying as it does on the
dizzyingly tautological phrase "an interest that may conflict" 29 as its
interpretive lynchpin. Indeed, NI 81-107 in many respects reflects the
uncertainty associated with its animating principle, rather than representing
any meaningful attempt to resolve it. The failure of the CSA to provide
sufficient substantive guidance respecting this central concept thus leaves
managers and IRCs without meaningful guidance respecting the content
and scope of their respective obligations under NI 81-107. Ultimately,
this substantive uncertainty opens the door to many of the potential
drawbacks of principles-based securities regulation identified above:
divergent interpretations respecting the scope and substantive content of
NI 81-107 and the prospect of both a chilling effect and regulatory creep.
This uncertainty is thus inconsistent with a principles-based regulatory
126. Christoph Kumpan & Peter C. Leyens, "Conflicts of Interest of Financial Intermediaries -
Towards a Global Common Core in Conflicts of Interest Regulation" (2008) 5 European Company
and Financial Law Review 72 at 75.
127. Ibid. at 75.
128. Ibid. at 77.
129. NI 81-107, supra note 4 at s. 1.2(a).
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paradigm and, as a result, likely to undermine the potential efficacy of NI
81-107.
Two brief examples may be of assistance in illustrating how the failure
of the CSA to sufficiently articulate the substantive content of NI 81-107
may ultimately undermine its potential efficacy. The first example arises
in the context of the compensation of portfolio management personnel.
The compensation of portfolio management personnel, particularly within
the mutual fund industry, is typically tied at least in part to the performance
of their funds relative to their peers (i.e. similar funds managed by other
managers) and/or relevant investment indices. Personnel compensated
on this basis thus possess an economic incentive to manage their funds
with a view to keeping pace, or at the very least not lagging behind, these
benchmarks. To the extent that such "index chasing" results in investment
decisions which deviate from the best interests of these funds and their
securityholders, there exists a clear and pressing agency problem and,
therefore, a conflict of interest. Yet the silence of NI 81-107 with respect
to this seemingly important issue is deafening. Do such compensation
practices constitute conflict of interest matters for the purposes of NI 81-
107? If so, given, inter alia, the substantial monitoring issues associated
with determining the internal intentions ofportfolio management personnel,
how should managers and IRCs approach the management of this conflict?
If not, which appears likely to be the case, why not-especially given the
seeming importance of this potential conflict? In this respect, NI 81-107 is
either hopelessly ambiguous or poorly designed to protect securityholders
from the pernicious effects of conflicts of interest. Indeed, it may be
both.
The second example arises in the context of a decision on the part of
a manager to terminate an agreement with a third-party service provider
with the intention of bringing such services "in-house" or, alternatively,
delegating them to an affiliate. As previously noted, to the extent that
the manager or its affiliate are thereby able to realize a profit from this
decision, the manager possesses a clear economic incentive to pursue this
course of action. At the same time, however, there exists no shortage
of other legitimate reasons why the manager may elect to terminate the
agreement including, inter alia, poor performance, uncompetitive pricing,
or a perceived increase in legal or reputational risk. The key, according to
the CSA, is ensuring that the decision of the manager is in the best interests
of the investment fund uninfluenced by the potential economic pay-off. 3 '
Does this mean, however, that the manager is prohibited from pursuing
130. Ibid. at s. 1.2 (Commentary).
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its economic self-interest in the circumstance where the manager does not
expect, on a reasonable basis, that the investment fund or its securityholders
will be negatively impacted? In such circumstance, on what basis should
the manager and its IRC determine whether a "fair and reasonable result
for the investment fund" has been achieved? Is the investment fund
entitled to share in the economic pay-off, or is the fact that the manager
does not reasonably expect the investment fund or its securityholders to
be negatively impacted sufficient to discharge this burden? These are
important and complex questions which reside at the crossroads of the
fiduciary and commercial aspects of the relationship between a manager,
an investment fund and its securityholders. Nevertheless, NI 81-107
remains silent with respect to these questions. In turn, this silence opens
the door for divergent and potentially sub-optimal interpretations of NI
81-107 on the part of both managers and IRCs.
The regulatory myopia manifest in the institutional design and
implementation of NI 81-107 is also reflected in the fact that, while the
instrument arguably contemplates a new role for managers (and certainly
for IRCs), the same cannot be said of the securities regulators which
collectively make up the CSA. NI 81-107 has not been accompanied by any
changes which would suggest that these regulators intend to loosen their
grip on the regulation of conflicts of interest in the Canadian investment
fund industry. Indeed, NI 81-107 had not even been proclaimed in force
when the CSA introduced a proposed national instrument articulating a
series of prescriptive rules regulating conflicts of interest in the context
of so-called "soft dollar" arrangements.' 3' This move was particularly
perplexing given that soft dollar arrangements are specifically referenced
within NI 81-107 as a species of potential conflict which the instrument
is designed to address.132 Similarly, there appears to have been no public
acknowledgement on the part of CSA members that they intend to carve
out a good faith sphere or adopt a more patient attitude toward enforcement
in order to promote innovation in the design and implementation of
conflict-related policies and procedures. 33 As we have already seen, in the
absence of such a sphere, managers are likely to behave as though subject
131. See Notice of Proposed National Instrument 23-102 Use of Client Brokerage Commissions
as Payment for Order Execution Services or Research ("Soft Dollar" Arrangements), (2006) 29:29
O.S.C.B. 5923 (21 July 2006) and, subsequently, Proposed National Instrument 23-102, Use of
Client Brokerage Commissions as Payment for Order Execution Services or Research Services and
Companion Policy 23-102CP, (2008) 31:2 O.S.C.B. 489.
132. NI 81-107, supra note 4 at s. 1.2 (Commentary).
133. While the argument can be made to take a "wait and see" approach to this issue, it is the comfort
provided by the acknowledgement of this protective sphere which promotes the innovation principles-
based regulation seeks to achieve.
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to prescriptive rules, thereby negating many of the potential benefits of
principles-based regulation.
Finally, CSA members have thus far taken few, if any, meaningful
steps to institutionalize the fledgling dialogue which characterized the
consultative process leading up to the promulgation of NI 81-107. Unlike
the FSA, for example, which restructured its internal organization,
considerably increased its phalanx of relationship management (including
call centre) personnel, and re-designed its education programs after
moving toward a more principles-based regime,'34 Canadian securities
regulators do not appear to have undertaken any meaningful organizational,
staffing, education or other institutional changes in connection with the
implementation of NI 81-107. Along the same vein, while it is difficult
to compare the FSA's comprehensive move toward more principles-based
regulation with the promulgation ofNI 81-107, CSAmembers do not appear
to have earmarked significant capital resources with a view to building the
requisite principles-based infrastructure. Furthermore, despite a flood of
substantive questions from within the Canadian investment fund industry-
many relating to the scope and substance of the definition of a conflict of
interest matter-the CSA responded with a largely redundant and highly
technical Staff Notice'35 which arguably provides little in the way of new
information or substantive guidance. Collectively, these decisions signal
that cultivating a more dialogic relationship and building an interpretive
community through which to amplify principles, disseminate substantive
guidance and ultimately establish shared understandings respecting NI 81-
107 are not at present high priorities for the CSA.
Given the apparent reluctance of the CSA to fully embrace the new
role contemplated for its members under a principles-based regulatory
paradigm, it would seem reasonable to suggest that regulated actors, too,
will elect to proceed with the utmost caution. Perhaps nowhere is this
caution likely to be more evident than in connection with the development
and dissemination of conflict-related industry "good" or "best" practices.
The CSA has placed considerable emphasis on the development of such
practices as vital to the long-term success of NI 81-107 and publicly
expressed confidence that such practices will emerge over time'3 6 and be
disseminated via, inter alia, industry trade associations such as IFIC and
the IRC's annual report to securityholders. However, observing that CSA
134. FSA, supra note 53 at 18.
135. See CSA Staff Notice 81-307, Frequently Asked Questions on National Instrument 81-107
Independent Review Committee for Investment Funds, (2007) 30:13 O.S.C.B. 2807 (30 March 2007).
136. NI 81-107, supra note 4 at s. 1.2 (Commentary).
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members have not fully bought into a principles-based philosophy, regulated
actors may rationally be expected not to invest significant resources in the
joint development of such practices nor expose themselves to potential
regulatory scrutiny by providing comprehensive public disclosure of
these practices.' 37 In this and many other respects, the failure of Canadian
securities regulators to fully embrace the philosophy of principles-based
regulation is likely to result in a downward spiral of apprehension and
distrust and, ultimately, undermine the effective regulation of the Canadian
investment fund industry.
As illustrated above, the threefold failure of the CSA and its members to
articulate sufficient substantive guidance, undertake necessary institutional
changes and pursue a more meaningful dialogue with regulated actors
suggests that the design and implementation of NI 81-107 is premised on a
narrow, formalistic view of principles-based securities regulation. Indeed,
to the extent that only one provincial regulator (British Columbia) has
even attempted to articulate its vision of what principles-based regulation
entails, one might query whether, and to what extent, principles-based
considerations factored into the CSA's thought process in connection
with the institutional design and implementation of NI 81-107. Whatever
the thought process, the narrow, formalistic view of principles-based
regulation upon which NI 81-107 is premised ultimately undermines its
potential efficacy.
V. Normative proposals
In light of the forgoing evaluation, the germane normative issues
thus become how Canadian securities regulators should approach the
regulation of conflicts of interest under NI 81-107 and, more broadly,
the institutional design and implementation of future principles-based
regulatory mechanisms.
Any attempt to enhance the potential efficacy of NI 81-107 as a
principles-based regulatory mechanism must necessarily begin with
the provision by the CSA of further substantive guidance. The singular
importance of this guidance cannot be underestimated, especially given
137. The early evidence respecting the validity of this expectation is mixed. While the disclosure
provided in the IRC annual report to securityholders in respect of many investment fund complexes
might best be described as perfunctory, there appear to be a growing number of managers and
IRCs committed to providing more fulsome disclosure. To observe the range of practices in this
respect, See the IRC annual reports filed in connection with the investment funds managed by RBC
Asset Management Inc. (filed 25 March 2009 for the year ended 31 December 2008), CIBC Asset
Management Inc. (filed 31 March 2009 for the year ended 31 December 2008), Scotia Securities Inc.
(filed 31 March 2009 for the year ended 31 December 2008) and BMO Harris Investment Management
Inc. (filed 31 March 2009 for the year ended 31 December 2008), online: <www.sedar.com>.
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the substantive uncertainty surrounding the legal principle animating
NI 81-107. First and foremost, the CSA must articulate the real-world
regulatory outcomes which they desire to achieve. This articulation must
extend beyond a mere regurgitation of the purposes for which securities
regulation in Canada exists. Rather, these regulatory outcomes must be
formulated in a manner that provides sufficient yardsticks against which
investment fund managers and IRCs can measure whether their policies,
procedures and conduct are in substantive compliance with NI 81-107 and
against which the performance of regulators can be meaningfully evaluated.
Whatever these desired regulatory outcomes may be, unless and until they
are clearly articulated by the CSA, regulated actors will be left wandering
the desert in search of the substantive guidance necessary to design and
implement conflict-related policies and procedures which are compliant
with NI 81-107. Accordingly, while the process of identifying and
articulating these regulatory outcomes may require some soul searching
on the part of Canadian securities regulators, it is nevertheless vital to the
efficacy of NI 81-107.
Most importantly, the efficacy of NI 81-107 is clearly tied to the
formulation of a more coherent definition of what constitutes a conflict
of interest matter. The substance of this definition must be constructed in
light of the regulatory outcomes which the CSA desires to achieve. If, for
example, the desired regulatory outcome is premised on the elimination
of self-interested behaviour on the part of managers, the definition of a
conflict of interest matter might be based on the existence of both motive
and opportunity for a manager to engage in a course of conduct which
manifests the potential to be both beneficial to the manager and detrimental
to an investment fund and/or its securityholders. If, on the other hand, the
desired regulatory outcome relates to the avoidance of actual (or potential)
harm to investment funds and/or their securityholders, this definition
might revolve around an examination of the deleterious impact of these
courses of action. Ultimately, what is important once again is articulating
a coherent definition of a conflict of interest matter-one which reflects the
reghlatory outcomes the CSA hopes to achieve through the promulgation
of NI 81-107. Only then will managers and IRCs find themselves on solid
ground in their efforts to achieve substantive compliance.
Finally, realizing the principles-based potential of NI 81-107 requires
a philosophical shift on the part of securities regulators. Specifically,
regulators must work to build a good faith sphere within which managers
and IRCs feel free to develop innovative policies and procedures respecting
conflict of interest matters. Regulators must also increase their efforts to
span the public/private divide by promoting a more honest and sophisticated
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dialogue with regulated actors. Such a dialogue is necessary to create the
interpretive community through which regulators and regulated actors can
amplify principles, disseminate substantive guidance and ultimately build
shared understandings.
The normative proposals to enhance the efficacy of NI 81-107
apply without modification to the design and implementation of future
principles-based regulatory mechanisms. First and foremost, regulators
must identify and clearly articulate the regulatory outcomes they desire
to achieve. The process of identifying and articulating these regulatory
outcomes must include an examination -of the legal and/or regulatory
principles underlying each proposed regulatory mechanism in order to
ensure that they are themselves sufficiently certain so as to provide a solid
substantive foundation. While the absence of such substantive certainty is
by no means fatal, regulators in such circumstances must make a concerted
effort to ensure sufficient certainty through the provision of substantive
guidance. Second, regulators must carve out a good faith sphere within
which regulated actors are free to employ their considerable accumulated
expertise toward designing compliance policies and procedures which
reflect the underlying principles and achieve substantive compliance with
desired regulatory outcomes. Finally, regulators must take meaningful
steps to institutionalize a dialogic relationship with regulated actors. Each
of these elements is vital to the efficacy of principles-based securities
regulation.
The move toward more principles-based regulation also clearly
requires a sustained commitment in terms of the allocation of resources
.and, more broadly, philosophical buy-in. Given the scope and scale of
this commitment, any move toward more principles-based regulation is
arguably likely to be more successful if implemented at the organizational
level, as the FSA and ASIC have done, rather than at the level of narrowly
targeted regulatory mechanisms such as NI 81-107. Indeed, it is unrealistic
to expect regulators and regulated actors to move fluidly between the
prescriptive and principles-based regulatory paradigms depending upon
-the subject matter of the regulation. Along the same vein, principles-based
regulation is arguably less likely to succeed in the context of a fractured
securities regulatory regime such as that which, lamentably, still exists in
Canada. In such a circumstance, where regulated actors may be required
to simultaneously comply with both prescriptive and principles-based
rules in different jurisdictions, many if not most of the potential benefits
of principles-based regulation will be lost. Accordingly, any further
move toward more principles-based regulation should perhaps be tabled
Principles, Prescriptions, and Polemics: Regulating 107
Conflicts of Interest in the Canadian Investment Industry
pending the implementation of a national securities regulatory authority
in Canada.
There exists one final precondition to the success of any move toward
more principles-based securities regulation. Securities regulators must
embrace a theoretical conception of principles-based regulation, one which
transcends the narrow formalism of the rules versus principles debate. As
amply illustrated by the largely empty rhetoric surrounding NI 81-107, the
term "principles-based" regulation is often invoked, but seldom defined.
The responsibility for this failure rests primarily with Canadian securities
regulators (other than British Columbia), who, while increasingly vocal
of their support for principles-based regulation, have utterly failed to
articulate their vision of this emerging regulatory paradigm. In this article,
I have advanced such a theoretical conception and explored its wisdom and
potential drawbacks. Furthermore, I have illustrated that, in the absence
of such a theoretical grounding, any move toward more principles-based
regulation-including NI 81-107-is unlikely to fulfill its inherent promise.
Conclusion
Conflicts of interest permeate the Canadian investment fund industry. The
effective regulation of these conflicts of interest is vital to the objectives of
investor protection, fostering fair and efficient capital markets and promoting
confidence in capital markets. In NI 81-107, the CSA has adopted what
it characterizes as a principles-based approach toward regulating these
conflicts of interest. Ultimately, I am agnostic as to whether principles-
based regulation represents the optimal paradigm-whether in connection
with the regulation of conflicts of interest in the investment fund industry
or financial markets more broadly. Notwithstanding what its growing
chorus of critics-incited by the market and regulatory failures which
precipitated the current global financial crisis-may suggest, it is simply too
early to tell whether the inherent promise of principles-based regulation
can be harnessed. As I have argued, any future success of principles-
based securities regulation will be conditional upon its institutional design
and implementation: articulating a clear theoretical conception of what
principles-based securities regulation is and, thereafter, fully embracing it
as a new paradigm-a new philosophical approach toward regulation. To
the extent that-the CSA and its members have thus far failed to acknowledge
the critical importance of these conditions, the prospects for principles-
based securities regulation-and for NI 81-107-appear unpromising.
